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Current U.S. Policy on the 
Crime of Aggression: History in 
the Unmaking? 
Donald M. Ferencz* 
At the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Society of 
International Law, a U.S. policy statement on the crime of 
aggression was presented as part of a panel entitled “The ICC 
Crime of Aggression and the Changing International Security 
Landscape.” This article examines current U.S. policy on the 
crime of aggression, highlighting the historic role that the U.S. 
played in establishing aggression as an international crime after 
World War II, and concludes that activation of ICC jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression would be a significant step forward 
in the development of international law. 
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I remind you that 23 members of the United Nations have 
bound themselves by the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal to 
the principle that planning, initiating or waging a war of 
aggression is a crime against humanity for which individuals as 
 
* The author is the Convenor of the Global Institute for the Prevention of 
Aggression, a visiting professor at Middlesex University School of Law 
in London, and a Research Associate at the Oxford University Faculty 
of Law’s Centre for Criminology. Readers may contact the author at: 
donferencz@aol.com. 
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well as states shall be tried before the bar of international 
justice. 1 
U.S. President Harry Truman, Addressing the U.N. General 
Assembly, 23 October 1946. 
I. Brief background on the crime of aggression 
Sixty million dead2 and the introduction of weapons of such mind-
numbing destructive capacity as to threaten all life on earth could not 
help but leave those who had survived the carnage of World War II 
determined to curb war-making itself.3 The year 1945 thus witnessed 
not only the establishment of the United Nations, whose Charter 
expressly prohibits the unauthorized use of force,4 but also the historic 
opening of the ground-breaking Nuremberg Trials, whose judgment 
indelibly and conspicuously branded aggressive war as “the supreme 
international crime.”5   
 
1. President Harry Truman, Address in New York City at the Opening 
Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Oct. 23, 1946) 
(transcript available at 
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/viewpapers.php?pid=914 
[https://perma.cc/9R39-B9SS]) (President Truman delivered this speech 
the night before the first anniversary of entry into force of the United 
Nations Charter). 
2. The 60 million total deaths, of which 45 million were civilian deaths, 
does not include up to 20 million people who may have been killed in 
China. WWII by the Numbers: World-Wide Deaths, NAT’L WWII 
MUSEUM, available at 
http://www.nationalww2museum.org/learn/education/for-
students/ww2-history/ww2-by-the-numbers/world-wide-deaths.html 
[https://perma.cc/5NYE-FRDT]. 
3. “We the Peoples of the United Nations Determined to save succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has 
brought untold sorrow to mankind . . . and to establish conditions under 
which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and 
other sources of international law can be maintained . . . And for these 
Ends to practice tolerance and live together in peace . . . and to unite 
our strength to maintain international peace and security, and to ensure 
. . . that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest . . . 
Have Resolved to Combine our Efforts to Accomplish these Aims” 
 See U.N. Charter pmbl. (emphasis added). 
4. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 41-42, 51 (proscribing the use of force unless 
authorized by the Security Council or occurring in response to an armed 
attack). 
5. 22 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 427 (1948) 
(The Nuremberg Trials included not only the quadripartite IMT held 
pursuant to The London Agreement of August 8, 1945, but also the 
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Students of history will know that the United States played a 
critical role in seeing to it that those accused at Nuremberg would 
stand trial for their crimes, rather than simply be taken out and shot–
–as was the initial preference of both Stalin and Churchill.6 Moreover, 
American insistence was responsible for assuring that crimes against 
peace was among the indictable offenses at Nuremberg––the first time 
in history that aggressive war-making would be charged as a crime 
and that those responsible for it would be held personally 
accountable.7  
The Nuremberg Charter, which set forth the provisions pursuant 
to which the International Military Tribunal (IMT) would be 
conducted, was annexed to the London Agreement signed on the 
morning of August 8, 1945.8 It enumerated three crimes for which 
individuals could be held accountable in their personal capacities, 
regardless of their positions of national leadership. These included war 
crimes, crimes against humanity, and crimes against peace––the core 
feature of which was the “planning, preparation, initiation or waging 
of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, 
agreements or assurances.”9 
 
twelve American-led “Subsequent Proceedings” held at Nuremberg 
pursuant to Control Council Law No. 10 of 20 December 1945). 
6. See Dave Johns, Defining Justice, FRONTLINE WORLD (Jan. 24, 2006), 
http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/iraq501/defining_index.html 
[http://perma.cc/SZ2H-XQE7] (describing Saddam Hussein’s capture, 
confinement awaiting trial, and history of imprisoning, rather than 
killing, enemy leaders). 
7. See Jonathan A. Bush, “The Supreme . . . Crime” and Its Origins: The 
Lost Legislative History of the Crime of Aggressive War, 102 COLUM. L. 
REV. 2324, 2326 (2002) (discussing the role of the United States in 
developing the inclusion of Crimes Against Peace in the Nuremberg 
Charter). 
8. Coincidentally, the London Agreement was signed on the same day that 
President Harry Truman put his signature to the United States 
ratification of the U.N. Charter, making the United States the first 
country to officially join the U.N. It is no small irony that before the 
sun had set  on Washington or on London that evening, an American B-
29 bomber had already taken off from the island of Tinian in the 
Pacific, en route to dropping the atomic bomb that was to obliterate the 
city of  Nagasaki just a few hours later. See The London Agreement of 
August 8th 1945 art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 58 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 280; 
John Q. Barrett, London Agreement (1945), JACKSON LIST (Aug. 8, 
2015), http://thejacksonlist.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/20150808-Jackson-List-London-Agreement.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9CCC-HQZ6] (describing the signing of the 
agreement). 
9. Nuremberg Charter art. 6; Nuremberg Trials Final Report Appendix D: 
Control Council Law No. 10 art. 2, ¶ 1(a) Dec. 20, 1945, available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imt10.asp [https://perma.cc/H7PQ-
9CNZ] (while the IMT’s definition of crimes against peace focused on 
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At Nuremberg, Sir Hartley Shawcross, the British prosecutor, 
articulated the proposition that those who conduct wars in violation 
of international law are ineligible to claim, in defense, that such wars 
were executed in accordance with the laws and customs of war: 
The killing of combatants in war is justifiable, both in 
international and in municipal law, only where the war itself is 
legal. But where a war is illegal . . . there is nothing to justify 
the killing, and these murders are not to be distinguished from 
those of any other lawless robber
 
bands.10  
At the end of the ten-month trial, the IMT delivered its judgment 
on September 30, 1946.11 Truman’s October address to the United 
Nations, quoted above, came close on its heels, and was part of an 
American-led initiative pushing for worldwide recognition of the legal 
precedents established at Nuremberg. Before the year was out, the 
General Assembly, acting at the behest of the United States, 
unanimously approved Resolution 95(I), affirming the Nuremberg 
principles and directing that work begin on codifying them within an 
international criminal code.12  
Immediately after the conclusion of the IMT, Justice Robert H. 
Jackson, the American Chief of Counsel at Nuremberg, reported on 
the import of the trial to President Truman. In his report he wrote 
that “[n]o one can hereafter deny or fail to know that the principles 
on which the Nazi leaders are adjudged to forfeit their lives constitute 
 
acts constituting illegal war, Control Council Law No. 10 went beyond 
this definition, expressly specifying that the crime also applied to 
invasions. Thus, Nuremberg’s subsequent proceedings—made up of a 
dozen more criminal trials during December of 1945 overseen by the 
United States, acting on its own authority—made an invasion, as 
distinct from a war, prosecutable as an act included within crimes 
against peace).  
10. 19 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 458 (1948) 
(emphasis added) (with my continuing thanks to Matthew Gillet and 
Manuel Ventura for bringing this quotation to my attention). 
11. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 5, at 427. 
12. Affirmation of the Principles of International Law Recognized by the 
Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal: General Assembly Resolution 95(I), 
U.N. AUDIOVISUAL LIBR. INT’L L. (2008), 
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ha/ga_95-I/ga_95-I_ph_e.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VSL2-BCH5] (explaining that upon the United 
States’ demand,  the U.N. General Assembly, on December 11, 1946, 
unanimously affirmed the principles of the Nuremberg Charter and 
judgment, and called for work to be undertaken regarding the 
development of an International Criminal Code based on those 
principles). 
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law, and law with a sanction.”13 At the pace at which matters 
appeared to be proceeding, his conclusion seemed, at the time, to be 
an accurate assessment of where things were headed. 
Notwithstanding such initial momentum toward universalizing 
Nuremberg’s core crimes, further progress was stymied by the politics 
of the Cold War.14 As a consequence, half a century would pass before 
the seeds of such early efforts showed signs of the hoped-for harvest.15 
The effort to bring to fruition a criminal code including 
Nuremberg’s core crimes achieved a milestone of historic proportions 
in 2002, with the entry into force of the Rome Statute (“the Rome 
Statute” or “the Statute”) of the International Criminal Court (“the 
Court” or “the ICC”).16 But, as far as the crime of aggression was 
concerned, there was still plenty of work to do. Though the Statute 
technically vested the Court with aggression jurisdiction, it provided 
that such jurisdiction could not be exercised until later provisions 
were adopted, defining the crime and specifying the conditions under 
which the Court could prosecute it.17 Precisely when––and if––such 
additional provisions might eventually be adopted was anyone’s guess, 
but it would certainly not occur prior to a review conference, expected 
to be held at least seven years after the coming into force of the Rome 
Statute.18 Thus, notwithstanding that there was finally a permanent 
international criminal court which had ostensibly been vested with 
jurisdiction over aggression, the “supreme international crime” found 
itself rather ignominiously relegated to a state of legal limbo. 
 
13. Letter from Justice Jackson to President Truman (Oct. 7, 1946) 
(emphasis added), (on file at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/jack63.asp 
[https://perma.cc/W9CP-95VN]). 
14. Giulio M. Gallarotti, Politics, International Justice, and the United 
States: Toward a Permanent International Criminal Court, DIVISION II 
FAC. PUBLICATIONS, Apr. 1999, at 3. 
15. See Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Security of Mankind, 
1996 Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n Vol. 2, U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.4/SER.A/1996/Add.1 (explaining that the efforts of the 
International Law Commission in this regard culminated in 1996 in the 
Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of Mankind). 
16. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 
183/9 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
17. Article 5.2 of the Rome Statute, prior to the amendments adopted at 
the Kampala Review Conference, stated:  “The Court shall exercise 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression once a provision is adopted in 
accordance with articles 121 and 123 defining the crime and setting out 
the conditions under which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with 
respect to this crime. Such a provision shall be consistent with the 
relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.” See id. at art. 
5, ¶ 2. 
18. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 123. 
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At present, despite such continuing relegation, proponents of the 
Court’s aggression jurisdiction have reasons for optimism. During the 
ICC Review Conference, held in Kampala in 2010, amendments to the 
Rome Statute were adopted by consensus, which, if activated, will 
finally grant the Court active jurisdiction over the crime of aggression 
possibly as early as 2017.19 According to the terms of such 
amendments, they may be activated––subject to the collective re-
approval of the Assembly of States Parties––once they have been 
ratified by at least thirty States Parties, twenty-eight of which have 
already done so.20  
Notwithstanding such progress, it is a sad fact that those who 
would commit the crime of aggression may still do so in the 
knowledge that the Court is currently powerless to prosecute them for 
it. But the days of such impunity may be numbered. As in the 
feature-length film with a similar-sounding title, the Court’s 
aggression jurisdiction stands tantalizingly close to activation as “the 
fourth element” of the Rome Statute21––a weapon of mass instruction 
in the arsenal of international law––signalling that aggressors may 
soon be held accountable for their crimes, just as Justice Jackson had 
predicted. 
 
19. The adopted amendments define the crime and provide the conditions 
under which the Court may exercise its jurisdiction. However, as part of 
an overall compromise package, it was agreed in Kampala that the 
Court would not be able to exercise its aggression jurisdiction until and 
unless thirty States Parties to the Rome Statute ratified the Kampala 
amendments and the Assembly of States Parties reapproved them, 
which approval could not occur until after January 1, 2017. It should be 
noted, however, that the definition of the crime of aggression, covering a 
litany of aggressive acts, was adopted outright, and is, therefore, neither 
subject to the peculiar additional thirty-ratifications rule nor re-
approval by the Assembly of States Parties. INT’L CRIM. CRT., Review 
Conference of the Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court, 
Kampala, 31 May – 11 June 2010 Official Records (2010), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/ASP9/OR/RC-11-ENG.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FX9B-29R7]. 
20. See  Ratification Status: Amendments on the crime of aggression to the 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, EQUIPO NIZKOR 
(Mar. 4, 2016), available at 
http://www.derechos.org/nizkor/aggression/doc/status.html 
[https://perma.cc/LU3K-AXG6] (showing that, as of March 7, 2016, the 
countries that had ratified the Kampala amendments on aggression 
included Andorra, Austria, Belgium, Botswana, Costa Rica, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, 
Germany, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Poland, 
Samoa, San Marino, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Switzerland, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay). 
21. Anyone who has seen the “The Fifth Element” (a 1997 film starring 
Bruce Willis, Gary Oldman, and Milla Jovovich) will know what I’m 
talking about. 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Current U.S. Policy on the Crime of Aggression 
195 
But not everyone agrees that activating the Court’s independent 
aggression jurisdiction is a good idea.22 The permanent members of 
the U.N. Security Council believe the Court’s aggression jurisdiction 
should not be exercisable without pre-clearance from the Council 
itself. Although only two of the permanent members of the Council 
(“P-5”) are Parties to the Rome Statute,23 their collective influence is 
significant.  
Moreover, although the compromise reached in Kampala allows 
states, in certain circumstances, to opt out of the Court’s aggression 
jurisdiction,24 the optics of such an opt-out may be problematic. After 
all, is it likely that a state involved in a legally questionable military 
action would risk the potential opprobrium associated with electing to 
opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction if it did not seriously 
believe that there was reasonable doubt as to the legality of its 
actions? And are such doubts something that any national leader 
would like to publicly admit? Beyond this, if such an opt-out 
occurred, is it possible that the “opt-out” state’s coalition partners 
might also feel tainted by such an opting out? Whether considerations 
such as these have had an influence or not, it is clear that not all who 
joined in negotiating the terms of Kampala’s compromise package are 
comfortable with how its provisions may combine to play out in 
practice.25 
 
22. For purposes of this essay, “independent” aggression jurisdiction refers 
to aggression jurisdiction which is either on a proprio motu or state 
referral basis, but not a situation referred by the Security Council. 
23. Thus far, only the United Kingdom and France have ratified the Rome 
Statute, thus becoming members of the ICC’s Assembly of States 
Parties. 
24. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at arts. 15 bis, 15 ter (showing how 
this rule applies to the Court’s aggression jurisdiction based on state 
referrals or proprio motu investigations brought at the behest of the 
Prosecutor of the ICC, but not to referrals by the U.N. Security 
Council). 
25. For a discussion of some of the concerns regarding uncertainties related 
to how the Kampala amendments may be interpreted, and urging the 
resolution of such uncertainties prior to 2017, see Harold Hongju Koh & 
Todd F. Buchwald, The Crime of Aggression: The United States 
Perspective, 109 AJIL 257, 257-85 (April 2015). In response to Koh and 
Buchwald see, e.g., Bing Bing Jia, The Crime of Aggression as Custom 
and the Mechanisms for Determining Acts of Aggression, 109 AJIL 569, 
569-82 (July 2015); Alain Pellet, Response to Koh and Buchwald’s 
Article: Don Quixote and Sancho Panza Tilt at Windmills, 109 AJIL 
557, 557-69 (July 2015). For an online discussions of this topic, see also 
Dapo Akande, AJIL Unbound Symposium on the Crime of Aggression, 
EJIL: Talk! (Mar. 3, 2106), available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/ajil-
unbound-symposium-on-the-crime-of-aggression/ 
[https://perma.cc/X58H-AV23]; John Bellinger, USG Concerns with the 
ICC Aggression Amendment, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 5, 2016, 7:09 AM), 
available at  https://www.lawfareblog.com/usg-concerns-icc-aggression-
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Finally, it should be recalled that at Nuremberg crimes against 
peace covered wars of aggression, or wars in violation of international 
treaties, agreements, or assurances. The definition of the crime of 
aggression set forth within the Kampala amendments goes well 
beyond this. In addition to criminalizing acts that would amount to 
crimes against peace at Nuremberg, it criminalizes a litany of acts 
which were characterized in a 1974 General Assembly resolution as 
prima facie acts of aggression,26 but only if they rise to the level of 
manifest violations of the UN Charter as to their combined character, 
gravity, and scale.27 
II. Current U.S. Policy on the ICC Crime of 
Aggression 
It is against this backdrop that at the 2015 annual meeting of the 
American Society of International Law, Sarah Sewall, the U.S. State 
Department’s Under Secretary for Civilian Security, Democracy, and 
Human Rights delivered what has been described as “a major policy 
speech on the crime of aggression.”28 The address presented three serious 
U.S. concerns with amendments to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court which, if made effective, will, at long last, operationalize 
Truman’s vision of a bar of international justice before which aggressors may be 
tried for their crimes.29  
 
amendments [https://perma.cc/L8B7-Q979]; David Bosco, Who’s Afraid 
of Aggression Prosecutions?, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 8, 2016, 1:15 PM), 
available at  https://www.lawfareblog.com/whos-afraid-aggression-
prosecutions [https://perma.cc/AQ4W-7EE6]. For a recent live debate 
regarding the crime of aggression, see Videotape: The International 
Criminal Court and the Crime of Aggression, on the website of the 
German Center for Research and Innovation, which hosted a discussion 
between Harold Koh and Professor Claus Kress (Feb. 22, 2016), 
available at http://www.germaninnovation.org/news-and-
events/videos?video=733f9287-f0df-e511-83dd-00155dcfd969&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/M56X-F456]. 
26. G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), Definition of Aggression, arts. 2-4 (Dec. 14, 
1974). 
27. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 8 bis (defining “crimes of 
aggression,” as adopted in Kampala).  
28. See Beth Van Schaack, U.S. Policy on the ICC Crime of Aggression 
Announced, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 21, 2015, 8:03 AM), available at 
http://justsecurity.org/22248/u-s-policy-icc-crime-aggression/ 
[https://perma.cc/4K2Y-W8S8]. 
29. See INT’L CRIM. CRT., supra note 19, at 17-22 (discussing the text of the 
compromise solution to activation of the Court’s jurisdiction that was 
agreed to at Kampala); Stefan Barriga & Leena Grover, A Historic 
Breakthrough on the Crime of Aggression, 105 AM. J. INT’L LAW 517, 
533 (2011) (explaining that “[u]ltimately, the political will in Kampala 
to end impunity for the crime of aggression united delegations and 
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As discussed below, the U.S. is concerned that activation of the Court’s 
aggression jurisdiction pursuant to the terms of the amendments and 
the negotiated list of understandings adopted in Kampala will: 
1) Have a chilling effect on potential coalition partners in U.S.-
led military actions which, though lacking legal authorization by 
the U.N. Security Council, may nonetheless be undertaken with 
legitimate humanitarian interests or objectives in mind, 
2) Make it more difficult to grant amnesty to leaders who are 
alleged to have committed the crime of aggression, thereby 
potentially impeding peace deals which would grant immunity 
for such offenses; and 
3) Impede the Court’s core mission of prosecuting for atrocity 
crimes by embroiling it in politically charged controversies, 
which it is unsuited to deal with.30 
Under-Secretary Sewall argued that such U.S. concerns “have 
been exacerbated by the efforts of some supporters of the amendments 
to promote an interpretation – which we believe flies clearly in the 
face of the plain language of the Rome Statute – contending that the 
Court’s aggression jurisdiction would extend even to the nationals of 
states parties that do not ratify the amendments.”31 This accusation, 
while not entirely clear, appears to refer to the fact that the terms 
 
enabled them to overlook any imperfections in the final outcome”); see 
generally Claus Kreß & Leonie von Holtzendorff, The Kampala 
Compromise on the Crime of Aggression, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1179 
(2010) (overviewing the compromises at the Kampala Conference); 
Jutta Bertram Nothnagel, A Seed for World Peace Planted in Africa: 
The Provisions on the Crime of Aggression Adopted at the Kampala 
Review Conference for the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court, AFR. LEGAL AID Q., available at 
http://www.africalegalaid.com/news/the-provisions-on-the-crime-of-
aggression-kampala-conference [https://perma.cc/85VA-3YCH] (stating 
that “[e]xactly because the crime is committed by leaders who ‘control 
or direct’ the machinery of the State, requiring State acceptance for 
their prosecution would seem to be highly counterproductive, especially 
if such acceptance can be rather easily withheld or withdrawn”); see 
S.C. RC/Res.6 (June 11, 2010); Sarah Sewall, Under Sec’y Civilian Sec., 
Democracy, & Hum. Rts., U.S. Dep’t State, Speech at the American 
Society of Law Annual Meeting: The ICC Crime of Aggression and the 
Changing International Security Landscape (Apr. 9, 2015) (transcript 
available at http://www.state.gov/j/remarks/240579.htm 
[https://perma.cc/PX5U-WGLX]) [hereinafter Sewall Speech] (her 
remarks may also be viewed online, including comments from the floor, 
at https://www.asil.org/resources/2015-annual-meeting 
[https://perma.cc/8ZNZ-DK6D]). 
30. Van Shaack, supra note 28. 
31. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
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agreed to in Kampala could allow the Court––in limited 
circumstances––to exercise its independent aggression jurisdiction over 
nationals of States Parties which have not yet ratified the Kampala 
amendments.32  
III. Observations Regarding the Stated U.S. Concerns 
A. Possible Chilling Effect on Military Coalition Partners 
First among the enumerated U.S. concerns is that activating the 
Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, as it is currently 
defined within the Rome Statute, “could chill the willingness of states 
to cooperate in certain military action where the legal basis for that 
action might be contested.”33 Such a concern is certainly 
understandable in the context of any military action which has 
neither been authorized by the U.N. Security Council nor undertaken 
in self-defense after an armed attack––as would generally be permitted 
under the U.N. Charter.34 It must be kept in mind that before any 
such action could be successfully prosecuted as an act of aggression 
under the Rome Statute, it would need to constitute a manifest 
violation of the U.N. Charter as to its combined character, gravity, 
and scale.35 Although the precise manner in which the Court will 
interpret the contours of such a threshold clause cannot be predicted 
with absolute certainty, it may reasonably be inferred that in order 
 
32. The compromise crafted and agreed to in Kampala allows for the 
assertion of jurisdiction over nationals of all states if the Security 
Council refers an aggression case. Short of a referral by the Security 
Council, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction over nationals of non-
States Parties, nor may it do so over nationals of States Parties which 
have opted out of the Court’s independent aggression jurisdiction. To 
avoid application of the Court’s independent aggression jurisdiction, a 
State Party need do nothing more than file a declaration to the effect 
that it elects to opt out of such jurisdiction. Such a jurisdictional regime 
brings into play the meaning of Article 121(5) of the Statute, discussed 
in further detail below – that is, whether a State Party may be required 
to opt out of the application of an amendment that it has not previously 
ratified. See infra Part III.D. As discussed below, the whole debate over 
Article 121(5) may be seen essentially as a “red herring,” since no State 
Party’s leaders need be subjected to the Court’s independent aggression 
jurisdiction should their State decide to opt out of such jurisdiction. See 
infra Part III.D 
33. See Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
34. See U.N. Charter arts. 2, 42, 51 (proscribing the use of force unless 
authorized by the Security Council or occurring in response to an armed 
attack); see generally C.G. WEERAMANTRY, ARMAGEDDON OR BRAVE 
NEW WORLD? REFLECTIONS ON THE HOSTILITIES IN IRAQ (1st ed. 2003) 
(providing an interesting discussion on the parameters of legality 
covering the use of armed force). 
35. See S.C. RC/Res. 6, supra note 29, at art. 8 bis(1). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Current U.S. Policy on the Crime of Aggression 
199 
for an act of aggression to warrant prosecution before the Court, it 
would need to constitute a fairly serious violation of the U.N. Charter 
as to some combination of its purpose, methods of execution, scope, 
and effects. This is a fairly clear indication that a bona fide 
humanitarian intervention is beyond the scope of what is covered by 
the Rome Statute’s definition of the crime of aggression––as it should 
be, akin to the manner in which the “necessity defense” is recognized 
in certain domestic criminal proceedings.36 
But there is some very good news here as far as possible “chilling 
effects” on potential U.S. coalition partners are concerned. Pursuant 
to the terms of the Kampala amendments, short of a referral by the 
Security Council, the Court can neither exercise its aggression 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties nor over an act of 
aggression committed by any State Party that elects to opt out of the 
Court’s aggression jurisdiction.37 Thus, should a State Party wish to 
insulate its nationals from possible prosecution with respect to a 
States Party or proprio motu situation referral, it need do nothing 
more than file a piece of paper with the Court, declaring that it will 
not be bound by the Court’s jurisdiction as to any acts of aggression 
which it may commit.38 The general effect of such an opt-out is not in 
dispute. 
Having said that, there are rather obvious reasons why no state 
would wish to be in a position of having to publicly opt out of the 
Court’s aggression jurisdiction. After all, wouldn’t such an opt-out 
run the risk of appearing to represent a concern––possibly even 
construed by some as an outright concession––that the state in 
question believes that its actions could potentially constitute the 
crime of aggression? And if such action was part of a broader military 
coalition, might such an opt-out have the undesirable consequence of 
bringing into question the legality of the entire military undertaking, 
thereby potentially giving rise to the spectre of culpability of each of 
the national leaders who bear responsibility for either initiating it or 
participating in it? 
 
36. See Jennifer Trahan, Defining the ‘Grey Area’ Where Humanitarian 
Intervention May not be Fully Legal, but is not the Crime of Aggression, 
2 J. USE FORCE & INT’L LAW, 42 (2015) (discussing the relationship 
between the crime of aggression and humanitarian intervention when 
the interveners are also the aggressors); R. v. Jones [2006] UKHL 16 
(appeal taken from the Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) (U.K.)), 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200506/ldjudgmt/jd060329
/jones.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWN9-5PS4] (discussing the crime of 
aggression in international customary law and its defenses). 
37. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis, ¶ 4 (describing the 
exercise of jurisdiction over the crime of aggression). 
38. See Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis, ¶ 4. 
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B. Impairment of Ability to Resolve Ongoing Conflicts 
The second of the U.S. concerns is that activating the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression “may reduce the ability of the international 
community to manage and resolve conflicts”39––meaning that it could 
be more difficult to broker peace deals if amnesty is sought by those who 
commit the crime of aggression. With respect to this issue, it must, once again, 
be kept in mind that, short of a referral by the U.N. Security Council, the Court 
lacks jurisdiction over acts of aggression committed by nationals of non-States 
Parties and, similarly, lacks jurisdiction over acts of aggression committed by 
States Parties which have opted-out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction. In 
essence, the option to opt-out, itself, offers an easy route to potential 
amnesty. 
It may be surmised that those who would be most likely to find 
themselves the subject of prosecution for the crime of aggression in 
the case of a state party or proprio motu referral would be in such a 
position because their own country elected not to opt-out of the 
Court’s jurisdiction. In such case, one might well conclude that their 
own societies view them as deserving of prosecution, rather than 
amnesties. At the same time, when the Security Council refers an 
aggression case, presumably there would be a rather strong 
international consensus that such a case should go forward. 
In reflecting on whether those in positions of power should be 
granted immunity for serious acts of aggression, it is hard not to be 
reminded of the words of Justice Jackson at Nuremberg: 
The common sense of mankind demands that law shall not stop 
with the punishment of petty crimes by little people. It must 
also reach men who possess themselves of great power and make 
deliberate and concerted use of it to set in motion evils which 
leave no home in the world untouched.40 
As highlighted in Under-Secretary Sewall’s address, the 
international community is opposed to amnesties for atrocity crimes.41 
To suggest immunity for those who propagate the illegal uses of force, 
which invariably result in the very atrocity crimes that the 
international community condemns, seems a far cry from the historic 
precedents established at Nuremberg. To deter the Court from 
 
39. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
40. 2 INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR 
CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 98-155 
(1947) (emphasis added). 
41. See Sewall Speech, supra note 29 (stating, “[w]hile the international 
community has strived for consensus around the principle that atrocities 
cannot legitimately be the subject of an amnesty, it is not obvious that 
the same approach is appropriate for the crime of aggression, which is of 
a fundamentally different character”). 
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enforcing the law, rather than deterring those who would break it, 
may be seen by some as expedient in the short term, but such an 
approach does nothing to advance respect for the predictable and 
uniform rule of law––a principle generally enshrined within U.S. legal 
traditions.42  
C. Interference with the ICC’s Core Mission of Prosecuting and Helping 
to Deter Atrocity Crimes 
The last of the three U.S. concerns is that activation of the Court’s 
aggression jurisdiction “will impair the Court’s ability to carry out its 
core mission––deterring and punishing genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes.”43 The basis for this concern is that 
“assessments involved in prosecuting aggression will inevitably be 
deeply political,”44 burdening the “already struggling”45 Court with “a 
role better suited for political actors.”46 Presumably, such remarks are 
in contemplation of a case which has not been referred by the 
Security Council, since any referral by the Council would likely 
already reflect a broad consensus––political or otherwise––regarding 
potential prosecution for the crime of aggression.  
As to cases growing out of a state referral or the Prosecutor’s 
proprio motu investigation power, the opt-out alternative clearly 
limits the prospect of prosecuting nationals without the assent of their 
own State of nationality. This, combined with the fact that 
jurisdiction over nationals of non-States Parties is altogether 
excluded, substantially limits the likelihood that any particular state’s 
point of view will exert undue influence because the assent of the 
state of the accused is, essentially, a prerequisite to prosecution. 
There is no question, however, that adjudication of cases relating 
to the crime of aggression will involve difficult and complex issues––
not the least of which may be the deep reluctance of states to disclose 
their sources of information and the details of intelligence-gathering 
networks and technologies. Divulging such details could, naturally, 
have significant political consequences for the states involved. But, 
 
42. The words “Equal justice under law” are etched in the portico of the 
United States Supreme Court. If they stand for anything, they certainly 
stand for predictable enforcement of law, rather than amnesty for those 
who break it. See generally Off. Curator, The West Pediment: 
Information Sheet, 
http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/westpediment.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9KB3-7RHT] (providing an overview, photos, and the 
history of the West Pediment of the Supreme Court Building). 
43. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
44. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
45. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
46. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
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the carte blanche assertion that aggression cases would necessarily 
and “inevitably be so deeply political” as to undermine the Court 
itself may well be viewed by skeptics as tantamount to an application 
of all-purpose gravy intended to mask the perhaps not-so-palatable 
cafeteria-style meatloaf simmering beneath its surface.  
The contention that the crime of aggression is, ipso facto, a 
“highly politicized crime” was voiced by State Department personnel 
well before the consent-based approach was developed and agreed in 
Kampala.47 Given the features of the consent-based regime adopted at 
the Review Conference––applicable to all but Security Council 
referred cases––the politicized prosecutions argument  seems to have 
significantly diminished currency compared to what may have been 
the case had the regime adopted in Kampala been less flexible.  
Beyond this, the Court lacks its own enforcement mechanisms 
and is, therefore, highly reliant on the goodwill of cooperating states 
to offer the access and assistance necessary for successful 
investigations and prosecutions. Consequently, unless there is 
cooperation on the part of the state whose nationals may be the 
subject of prosecution for the crime of aggression, such prosecution 
could be so hampered as to be beyond successful prosecution by the 
Court. It may, therefore, be prudent of the Court to heed the 
concerns voiced by the U.S. in such circumstances, and avoid 
dissipating its resources and reputation on such cases. 
D. Jurisdiction over Nationals of Non-ratifying States Parties: The 
Article 121(5) Issue 
The concern that the jurisdictional regime agreed to in Kampala 
potentially allows the Court to exercise its aggression jurisdiction over 
nationals of States Parties, regardless of whether or not their State 
has ratified the Kampala amendments raises an apparent conflict with 
the language of Article 121(5) of the Statute.48 
 
47. Harold H. Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at the 
Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: The 
Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010) 
(transcript available at 
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm 
[https://perma.cc/R4JG-UCUN]). 
48. It should be kept in mind that the compromise crafted and agreed to in 
Kampala allows for the assertion of jurisdiction over nationals of all 
states if the Security Council refers an aggression case. Short of a 
referral by the Security Council, the Court cannot assert jurisdiction 
over any nationals of non-States Parties, and may only assert 
jurisdiction over nationals of States Parties which have failed to 
affirmatively opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction – but only 
where such nationals are accused of committing the crime of aggression 
against a State Party which, itself, has ratified the Kampala 
amendments. To avoid having its nationals potentially subject to the 
Court’s jurisdiction in such a case, a State Party need simply file a piece 
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The key element of the argument for any State Party wishing not 
to have the Court’s aggression jurisdiction applied to its nationals is 
that, on its face, Article 121(5) of the Statute would seem to allow a 
State Party to avoid the application of such jurisdiction by simply not 
ratifying the amendments. In such case, an argument raised with 
respect to the Kampala amendments is that States Parties cannot be 
required to affirmatively opt out of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction 
unless they have already ratified the amendments, since if they fail to 
ratify, such jurisdiction wouldn’t apply to their nationals in the first 
place. 
Although the issue, as more fully discussed immediately below, 
may appear to be an arcane and even confusing topic, at the end of 
the day, the basic question is really fairly simple: Will the countries 
which adopted the Kampala amendments in a resolution which 
claimed that they were “[r]esolved to activate the Court’s jurisdiction 
over the crime of aggression as early as possible” make good on that 
promise or not? Will powerful states agree to be bound by the law 
criminalizing acts of aggression - or is such law only for those who 
must rely on the force of law, rather than the law of force, to make 
their way through the landscape of global affairs? 
At the outset of the discussion regarding Article 121(5) it should 
be kept in mind that the Article 121(5) issue is of greatest concern to 
non-ratifying States Parties who wish to limit the risk of scrutiny by 
the ICC with respect to their prospective commission of acts involving 
the use of force not authorized by the U.N. Charter. Once a State 
Party ratifies the Kampala amendments, the issue of how Article 
121(5) ought best be interpreted becomes completely moot as to that 
State Party.  
It should be noted that even if the State Party in question has 
ratified, they may still opt out of the Court’s independent aggression 
jurisdiction if they wish to.49 Thus, the apparent real crux of the 
concern is not really about being forced to accept the ICC’s 
independent jurisdiction over the crime of aggression, but rather how 
a state will look in front of the eyes of the world if it opts out of such 
jurisdiction in an effort to insulate its leaders from possible judicial 
scrutiny for the crime of aggression. In this regard, any “group opt-
outs” may be seen as little more than an attempt at camouflage.  
 
of paper, declaring that it elects to opt out of the Court’s aggression 
jurisdiction. 
49. Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 15 bis(4) (“The Court may, in 
accordance with article 12, exercise jurisdiction over a crime of 
aggression, arising from an act of aggression committed by a State 
Party, unless that State Party has previously declared that it does not 
accept such jurisdiction by lodging a declaration with the Registrar. The 
withdrawal of such a declaration may be effected at any time and shall 
be considered by the State Party within three years.”). 
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 48 (2016) 
Current U.S. Policy on the Crime of Aggression 
204 
Insofar as the opt-out provisions agreed to in Kampala are 
concerned, Article 121(5) has no application whatsoever to any case 
where the Security Council has referred a situation involving an 
aggression charge, since in such case, neither States Parties nor non-
States Parties have any right to opt out of the Court’s jurisdiction. 
Similarly, as to States Parties which have demonstrated their 
commitment to activating the Court’s aggression jurisdiction through 
their own ratification of the Kampala amendments,  any argument as 
to tension between the express language of the Kampala amendments 
and the express language of Article 121(5) is completely moot.  
Non-ratifying States Parties wishing to avoid the application of 
the Kampala amendments to their own nationals may well point to 
the language of Article 121(5) for support. Yet whether Article 121(5) 
may be seen to shield them from potentially having to affirmatively 
opt out of aggression amendments which they have not yet ratified, is 
a question which does not exist in isolation: it must be considered 
within the context of the broader Rome Statute itself. 
Let’s begin by looking at Article 121(5). It provides: 
Any amendment to articles 5, 6, 7 and 8 of this Statute shall 
enter into force for those States Parties which have accepted the 
amendment one year after the deposit of their instruments of 
ratification or acceptance. In respect of a State Party which has 
not accepted the amendment, the Court shall not exercise its 
jurisdiction regarding a crime covered by the amendment when 
committed by that State Party’s nationals or on its territory.50 
Although on its face, Article 121(5) would seem to expressly 
exempt nationals of non-ratifying States Parties from the application 
of any amendments to article 5, 6, 7, and 8 of the Statute, such 
language is either directly at odds with other provisions of the Statute 
or incongruous in their light. For example, pursuant to Article 12(2) 
of the Statute, the Court may assert jurisdiction even over nationals 
of states which have altogether failed to ratify the Rome Statute if 
their nationals commit genocide, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity on the territory of a State Party. This means that 
notwithstanding the fact that the Rome Statute has not “entered into 
force” at all as far as the states of the perpetrators of such crimes are 
concerned, the perpetrators may still come within the jurisdiction of 
the Court. The issue of “coming into force” and ICC jurisdiction are 
thus, two quite distinct things. 
In a moment the contrast between the exceptions to jurisdiction 
referenced in Article 124 versus Article 121(5) will be explored. 
However, before doing that, let’s reflect for a moment on whether, 
when drafted, Article 121(5)’s second sentence could possibly ever 
 
50. Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 121(5). 
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have meant, in isolation, what it seems to say. Here is the point: from 
inception, it has clearly been understood that, even as to non-ratifying 
states, the ICC may assert jurisdiction where a crime over which the 
ICC is able to exercise jurisdiction is committed on the territory of a 
State Party. (Let’s put aside, for purposes of this discussion, the fact 
that in Kampala it was agreed, strictly as a matter of compromise, to 
completely exclude all nationals of non-States Parties from the ICC’s 
state referral and proprio motu aggression jurisdiction).  
If Article 121(5) is read to literally mean what it says, without 
considering (as Article 124 does) the territorial jurisdictional rule 
found within Article 12, what do we have? We have a provision which 
seems to say that States Parties which do not ratify subsequent 
amendments to the core crimes of the ICC would have an absolute 
carte blanche “get out of jail free” card to play with respect to crimes 
which, if they were committed by non-States Parties on the territory 
of accepting States Parties would be fully subject to the Court’s 
jurisdiction. Could this possibly have been the intention of the 
drafters of Article 121(5)? Did they really mean to suggest that, 
although the Court’s jurisdiction over amendments to the ICC’s core 
crimes could clearly apply to nationals of non-States Parties, Article 
121(5) would fully exempt nationals of States Parties in all cases––
even including Security Council referrals, and regardless of where the 
crimes were committed? Was the message intended to be that there 
are fully two groups of countries in the world––those which have 
ratified no portion of the Rome Statute, yet whose nationals may still 
be subject to the Court’s jurisdiction for crimes committed by them 
on the territory of Member States and those which, by ratifying the 
Rome Statute of the ICC, can potentially completely avoid any such 
ICC jurisdiction as applied to amended core crimes––even if the 
referral comes from the Security Council itself? Could this really be 
what was intended?  
When we analyze Article 124, below, and then compare its carve-
out of jurisdiction to the language of Article 121(5), the comparison 
makes a literal reading of Article 121(5) seem even more untenable. 
By contrast with Article 121(5), the abrogation of jurisdiction rule 
found in Article 124 (relating to opting out of war crimes provisions 
for a 7 year period)––expressly limits itself to the Court’s state referral 
and proprio motu jurisdiction.51 It could not be clearer that Article 
 
51. Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art 124 (providing, in pertinent part: 
“Notwithstanding article 12, paragraphs 1 and 2, a State, on becoming a 
party to this Statute, may declare that, for a period of seven years after 
the entry into force of this Statute for the State concerned, it does not 
accept the jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the category of 
crimes referred to in article 8 when a crime is alleged to have been 
committed by its nationals or on its territory.”); Rome Statute, supra 
note 16, at art. 12 (stating, in pertinent part:  
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124 expressly provides that the rules of Article 12(1) and (2) do not 
trump the jurisdictional carve-out for war crimes. Because Article 12 
does not cover the grant of ICC jurisdiction based on Security Council 
referrals (which is set forth in Article 13(c)), this means that the 
carve-out of the Court’s jurisdiction allowed under Article 124 is 
limited to the type of jurisdiction which may be conferred under 
Article 12––and does not cover any carve-out of jurisdiction in cases 
where the Security Council refers a case. Hence, the exception to 
jurisdiction enunciated in Article 124 is qualitatively narrower and 
more explicit than that articulated in Article 121(5).  
The distinct difference between the texts of Articles 121(5) and 
124 raises the obvious question: If Article 121(5) meant to completely 
override the general jurisdictional rules imbedded within Article 12 
(including its territorial jurisdiction implications) why did it not say 
so in the very same way that such exception was expressly and 
unambiguously articulated in Article 124? Why doesn’t Article 
121(5), like Article 124, begin with language that says 
“Notwithstanding Article 12 paragraphs 1 and 2”?  
By contrast, Article 121(5) contains no limitation at all on its 
exception from the Court’s jurisdiction. Upon a literal reading, taken 
in isolation, this would seem to imply that the carve-out of 
jurisdiction under the second sentence of Article 121(5) is absolute. 
Presumptively, therefore, if we look only to the literal language of 
Article 121(5) (as opposed, for example, to the jurisdictional carve-out 
 
       1. A State which becomes a Party to this Statute thereby accepts the 
jurisdiction of the Court with respect to the crimes referred to in article 
5.  
2.In the case of article 13, paragraph (a) or (c), the Court may exercise 
its jurisdiction if one or more of the following States are Parties to this 
Statute or have accepted the jurisdiction of the Court in accordance 
with paragraph 3:  
       (a) The State on the territory of which the conduct in question    
occurred or, if the crime was committed on board a vessel or aircraft, 
the State of registration of that vessel or aircraft;  
       (b) The State of which the person accused of the crime is a national.”); 
       Rome Statute, supra note 16, at art. 13 (“The Court may exercise its 
jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in article 5 in accordance 
with the provisions of this Statute if:  
        (a) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by a State Party in 
accordance with article 14;  
        (b) A situation in which one or more of such crimes appears to have 
been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council 
acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations; or  
        (c) The Prosecutor has initiated an investigation in respect of such a 
crime in accordance with article 15.”). 
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language found within Art. 124) ––not even a referral by the Council 
would be sufficient to vest the Court with jurisdiction over the 
national of a State Party which has failed to ratify an amendment to 
the core crimes provisions, regardless of where the crime is alleged to 
have been committed. Once again, the question arises: Can such an 
overly broad interpretation of Article 121(5) possibly be construed as 
reasonable in light of the entirety of the Rome Statute?  
But any confusion caused by the seeming conflicts within the 
Rome Statute is neither the fault nor the work of the Kampala 
Review Conference. Beyond this, one might well argue that the 
provisions of the Kampala compromise are controlling as to the 
aggression amendments if for no other reason than the Rome Statute, 
with quite specific and unique reference to the crime of aggression 
itself, expressly authorized the Assembly of States Parties to adopt a 
provision “defining the crime and setting out the conditions under 
which the Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this 
crime.”52 And that is precisely what the Review Conference did in 
Kampala. It would appear more than a bit inconsistent to argue that 
Article 121(5) is a lex specialis rule that should be construed to 
expressly supersede the provisions of Article 12 without conceding 
that the language of Article 124 provides language that is much more 
precise in doing so.  
As to arguments regarding the potential lex specialis implications 
of Article 121(5)53, it should be noted that––as to the question of 
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression––you can hardly get more lex 
specialis than the very specific and explicit authorization contained in 
Article 5.2. It quite directly references the Assembly of States Parties’ 
authority with respect to the adoption of a provision “defining the 
crime [of aggression] and setting out the conditions under which the 
Court shall exercise jurisdiction with respect to this crime.”54  The 
language of Article 5.2 specifying that the adoption of such a 
provision be in accordance with Articles 121 and 123 arguably goes 
much more to the question of amendment procedure and issues 
related to entry into force, rather than to issues pertaining to 
jurisdiction––especially in light of the fact that it is clear, according to 
the language of Article 5.2, that it will be the adopted provision, 
itself, which will specify “the conditions under which the Court shall 
exercise jurisdiction”55 with respect to the crime of aggression. 
 
52. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2). 
53. The lex specialis argument is that Article 121(5) is so specific that it 
effectively “trumps” the more general jurisdictional rules set forth 
elsewhere within the Statute. Rome Statute, supra note 16.  
54. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2) (emphasis added). 
55. Rome Statute, supra note 16, art. 5(2). 
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Moreover, one cannot ignore the fact that a literal reading of 
Article 121(5) would seem to allow that section’s carve-out of 
jurisdiction to exempt the nationals of States Parties even where the 
Security Council has referred an aggression case.  This factor, alone, 
would seem sufficient to demonstrate that Article 121(5) cannot 
possibly be conclusively interpreted without considering other relevant 
provisions within the Statute. 
Any suggestion that the Kampala amendments are being 
inappropriately interpreted with respect to the conclusion that their 
opt-out provisions apply to both ratifying as well as non-ratifying 
States Parties raises a number of questions. For example, if, in 
Kampala, the consensus was that the opt-out mechanism only applies 
to ratifying States Parties, why wasn’t such a limitation spelled out 
within the language of the amendments themselves or agreed to and 
included in the understandings which accompanied them? Moreover, 
if mere non-ratification was seen in Kampala as sufficient to 
completely exempt nationals of States Parties even if they commit the 
crime of aggression on the territory of ratifying States Parties, why all 
the fuss in Kampala in crafting the compromise opt-out mechanism in 
the first place? Thus, rather than being crticized as flying in the face 
of the Rome Statute, the conclusion that the opt-out regime applies 
to all States Parties should perhaps more charitably be viewed as a 
matter of faithful adherence to the quite specific jurisdictional 
provisions adopted by consensus in Kampala. 
Finally, notwithstanding the mental gymnastics that may 
accompany a discussion of how Article 121(5) should properly be 
construed, the question of whether a State Party wishing to avoid the 
Court’s Article 15 bis aggression jurisdiction may need to opt out 
even if it has not ratified the aggression amendments is more about 
appearances than about substance. The real question is whether the 
promise made in Kampala “to activate the Court’s jurisdiction over 
the crime of aggression as early as possible” will be kept by those who 
made it.  
IV. U.S. Suggestions for Mitigation of its Concerns 
In light of the expressed U.S. concerns with the Kampala 
amendments, Under-Secretary Sewall suggested a series of possible 
steps to mitigate the concerns: 
Governments and parliaments of states parties could formally 
state their views on the questions raised here. They can clarify 
the scope of which acts are covered and confirm that the 
amendments do not apply to states parties that do not ratify 
the amendments. They could do this, for example, in statements 
at upcoming sessions of the ICC’s Assembly of States Parties, or 
in written instruments communicating their decision whether or 
not to ratify. 
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Perhaps most critically, if there were eventually a decision by 
the Assembly of States Parties to activate the amendments, 
states could insist that that decision contain clear guidance on 
these issues. 
States parties could clarify how the “opt-out” provisions 
contained in the amendments might be used to help address the 
concerns raised here and serve as a guardrail or check on an 
overly broad application of the amendments. 
States parties could also consider other steps, including the 
possibility of adopting further understandings to ensure these 
amendments do not work at cross-purposes to the critical goal 
of preventing atrocity crimes.56 
V.  Further Reflections and Concluding Thoughts 
The proposed mitigation steps set forth above are generally 
tailored to address concerns regarding clarity, both as to definition 
and jurisdictional reach. They are also arguably aimed at 
circumscribing the scope of the Court’s aggression jurisdiction. 
Regardless of the practicability of such proposed mitigation steps, the 
U.S.––though not a party to the Rome Statute––still has considerable 
influence, and it would, therefore, be surprising if the U.S. concerns 
were simply ignored. Yet the United States is conspicuous in leading the 
world in military spending as well as export of arms,57 at least some of which 
may be suspected of having contributed to the commission of some of the very 
atrocity crimes to which the ICC and the U.S. stand in opposition.58 The extent 
 
56. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
57. See Skye Gould & Jeremy Bender, These Charts Show the Immensity of 
the US’ Defense Budget, BUS. INSIDER UK (Aug. 31, 2015, 3:25 PM), 
http://uk.businessinsider.com/the-us-defense-budget-is-massive-2015-
8?r=US&IR=T [https://perma.cc/JN54-7EHP] (“In 2015, the US’ 
estimated military budget is expected to be $601 billion, down from 
$610 billion spent in 2014. However, even with the budgetary 
drawdown, the US still far outspends the next six highest spending 
nations.”); Thom Shanker, U.S. Arms Sales Make Up Most of Global 
Market, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/27/world/middleeast/us-foreign-
arms-sales-reach-66-3-billion-in-2011.html?_r=1 
[https://perma.cc/37LF-24RT] (“Overseas weapons sales by the United 
States totalled $66.3 billion last year, or more than three-quarters of the 
global arms market, valued at $85.3 billion in 2011. Russia was a distant 
second, with $4.8 billion in deals”).  
58. That the current U.S. administration is indeed committed to helping 
prevent atrocity crimes is beyond question, and such commitment is 
clearly evidenced by the ongoing work of the Atrocity Prevention Board, 
established by the Obama Administration in 2012. Yet, in what may be 
viewed by some as an anomalous contrast, in the recent federal court 
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to which global perceptions with respect to such factors may have a bearing on 
reactions to U.S. overtures regarding clarifying or limiting the Court’s aggression 
jurisdiction is an open question.  
The suggestion that confirmation should be forthcoming from the 
ICC community to the effect that nationals of State Parties which 
have neither ratified nor opted out of the Kampala amendments 
should be immune from the Court’s independent aggression 
jurisdiction may very well meet significant resistance. This is so 
because the bundle of provisions that was adopted by consensus in 
Kampala represented what could perhaps best be characterized as a 
fully integrated compromise package. In describing the nature of the 
deal struck there, Harold Koh, at the time Legal Advisor to the U.S. 
Department of State––and a key negotiator of the package agreed to 
at the Kampala Review Conference––put it this way: “Every single 
piece of it was a critical part of what was decided.”59 He was, of 
course, correct and there can be no getting away from his conclusions 
in this regard.  
It is impossible not to acknowledge that support for every aspect 
of what was agreed to in Kampala may be a bit difficult to trace back 
to specific language contained in the Rome Statute.60 For example, 
the requirements that, before the Court may assert its aggression 
jurisdiction over anyone, the Kampala amendments must not only be 
ratified by thirty States Parties, but re-approved by the Assembly of 
States Parties after January 1, 2017, are certainly not expressly found 
 
case of Sundus Shaker Saleh, et al. v. George W. Bush, et al. (involving 
an Iraqi citizen displaced by the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003), 
counsel for the United States have argued, among other things that: 
 The plain language of the Westfall Act clearly immunizes any 
government official who acts within the scope of employment. It is 
irrelevant whether plaintiff has successfully alleged a violation of such 
international law norms. The Westfall Act grants absolute immunity to 
federal employees for “wrongful” acts taken within the scope of 
employment, whether or not they are illegal. 
 See Brief for Appellee at 20, Saleh, et al., v. Bush, et al., 2015 WL 
4937588 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 15-15098). The government brief in 
question goes on to point out that, for purposes of immunizing 
government officials under the Westfall Act, it is irrelevant whether 
they have committed “scope of employment” acts such as torture, rape, 
or “egregious torts that violate jus cogens norms.” Id. at 27-28. 
59. American Soc’y Int’l Law., The U.S. and the International Criminal 
Court: Report from the Kampala Review Conference, YOUTUBE (June 
18, 2010), available at 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hJcUqEwrNS4 
[https://perma.cc/KK4Z-AN3Z] (statement of Harold H. Koh at 
1:04:17). 
60. See INT’L CRIM. CRT., supra note 19; see also S.C. RC/Res. 6, supra 
note 29. 
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within the language of the Rome Statute. These two constraining 
hurdles were developed during the Kampala review conference, where 
they were agreed upon as a matter of reaching a compromise solution 
capable of being approved by consensus––within the limits, of course, 
of what might reasonably be sustained as positions consistent with the 
Statute. As the consensus achieved in Kampala demonstrates, the 
establishment of such hurdles was accepted as being sufficiently 
within the competence of the Review Conference so as not to disturb 
the process of reaching an effective compromise agreement. 
It is true, of course, that Article 121(5)––a mixed provision, 
touching on entry into force as well as jurisdiction––does little to 
advance the cause of clarity. There can be little argument that, read 
literally and isolation, at first blush it would appear to entirely 
exempt nationals of non-ratifying States Parties from the Court’s 
exercise of aggression jurisdiction. Yet, as discussed above, there is 
simply no way that such a construction can be squared with the 
broader language of the Statute, nor with the delicate balance of 
compromises that were arduously negotiated and ultimately agreed to 
in Kampala.61  
Given the substance of Under-Secretary Sewall’s speech, its title 
“The ICC Crime of Aggression and the Changing International 
Security Landscape,” offers food for thought. In concluding her 
remarks, she candidly emphasized, “[t]o be sure, the activation of the 
Court’s jurisdiction over aggression is not a step that the United 
States has sought.”62 This would certainly seem to imply a preference 
for a Court whose hands continue to be tied as to the crime of 
aggression. Because of this, some may suspect that the U.S. is more 
interested in maintaining the current international landscape than in 
changing it.   
It may well be said that the current state of global relations more 
nearly represents an insecurity landscape, than one of security, whose 
horizon happens to be dwarfed by U.S. prominence in many respects, 
including as the world leader in global arms exports and military 
spending.63 Because of this, some may question whether U.S. non-
support of the Kampala amendments, like its non-membership in the 
Court itself, may perhaps be based on perceived geopolitical, rather 
than merely humanitarian, interest and objectives.  
 
61. See supra Part III.D. 
62. Sewall Speech, supra note 29. 
63. The United States Leads Upward Trend in Arms Exports, Asia and Gulf 
States Arms Imports Up, Says, STOCKHOLM INT’L PEACE RES. INST. 
(Mar. 16, 2015), available at 
http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 
[https://perma.cc/LS8R-4DDW]. 
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The remark that activation of the Court’s jurisdiction over 
aggression is not a step that the United States has sought makes 
rather short shrift of the broader track record of the United States 
and its historic role in working to establish aggression as a 
prosecutable international crime. Without the insistent leadership of the 
United States, the waging of aggressive war––or, as it was characterized by the 
IMT, war “in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances”––
would never have been made the cornerstone of the criminal indictments at 
Nuremberg, nor unanimously affirmed as an international crime in December of 
1946 by the U.N. General Assembly.64 
There is no question that the American architects of the 
Nuremberg Trials led the way in the last century in criminalizing 
aggressive war-making. In doing so, they certainly took a historic step 
forward. Perhaps with this in mind, Justice Jackson, in his opening 
statement before the IMT, unapologetically observed, “[u]nless we are 
prepared to abandon every principle of growth for international law, 
we cannot deny that our own day has the right to institute customs 
and to conclude agreements that will themselves become sources of a 
newer and strengthened international law.”65 
So, too, today, in proscribing not only wars of aggression, but also 
serious acts of aggression, the Kampala amendments may similarly 
represent a historic step forward. Whether current U.S. policy will 
ultimately have the effect of contributing to the making of such 
history, or, instead, to its unmaking, yet remains to be seen. 
   
 
 
64. See G.A. Res. 95, U.N. Doc. A/64/Add.l (1947). 
65. INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL, supra note 40, at 147. 
